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NOT TURNING A DEAF EAR: HOW  
K.M. V. TUSTIN UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT 
EXPANDS THE RIGHTS OF DEAF OR  
HARD-OF-HEARING STUDENTS 
Liliana Kim  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified School District1 was a 
matter of first impression before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 
The court consolidated two California district court cases that were 
strikingly similar in their facts and procedural histories.3 Both cases 
involved claims by deaf or hard-of-hearing students,4 K.M. and D.H., 
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).5 The 
plaintiffs claimed that their school districts, Tustin Unified School 
 
  J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. English, University 
of Pennsylvania, May 2001; M.A. English Education, Columbia University, May 2003. Sincere 
thanks to Professor Aimee Dudovitz for serving as advisor and mentor, and to the editors of 
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their hard work and talent. I dedicate this Comment to my 
parents, my husband Daniel, and our sons Elliot and Wyatt—for making all this possible, and 
worthwhile. 
 1. K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 2. Id. at 1100. 
 3. See K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., No. SACV 10-1011 DOC (MLGx), 
2011 WL 2633673 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011), rev’d in part, 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013); D.H. v. 
Poway Unified Sch. Dist., No. 09CV2621-L NLS, 2011 WL 883003 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2011). 
 4. Much confusion surrounds the use of the terms “deaf” and “hard of hearing,” the most 
socially accepted terms to describe those with hearing loss. UNIV. OF WASH., How Are the Terms 
Deaf, Deafened, Hard of Hearing, and Hearing Impaired Typically Used?, DO-IT (Jan. 22, 
2013), http://www.washington.edu/doit/Faculty/articles?86. Generally, “deaf” refers to a hearing 
loss so severe that there is little or no functional hearing. Id. “Hard of hearing” refers to a hearing 
loss with enough residual hearing that an auditory device can adequately assist the processing of 
speech. Id. “How people ‘label’ or identify themselves is personal and may reflect identification 
with the deaf and hard of hearing community, the degree to which they can hear, or the relative 
age of onset.” Community and Culture—Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L ASS’N OF THE 
DEAF, http://www.nad.org/issues/american-sign-language/community-and-culture-faq (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2014). The Ninth Circuit referred to the plaintiffs K.M. and D.H. as “deaf or hard 
of hearing,” and the author follows suit in this Comment. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1092. 
 5. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1092; see infra note 47 and accompanying text about Title II of the 
ADA. 
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District in Orange County and Poway Unified School District in San 
Diego County, had an obligation to provide them with 
Communication Access Realtime Translation (CART) services.6 
Also known as Computer Aided Realtime Captioning, CART is a 
speech-to-text, word-for-word transcription service that is becoming 
one of the most requested services for the deaf or hard of hearing.7 
The main question before the court was whether the plaintiffs 
were foreclosed from pursuing a claim under the ADA when they 
had already failed on a claim under the Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act (IDEA).8 In answering this question, two derivative 
issues surfaced. First, the court considered whether the IDEA and the 
ADA impose similar and overlapping obligations on school districts 
to accommodate the needs of disabled students.9 Second, the court 
considered who is in the best position to assess the needs of disabled 
students, and to what extent those needs should be met.10 
K.M. v. Tustin was the first case to address these issues with 
regard to assistive technology devices for deaf or hard-of-hearing 
students in a school setting.11 The court held that the ADA and IDEA 
imposed different and sometimes non-overlapping requirements on 
school districts to meet the educational and communication needs of 
disabled students.12 Thus, the plaintiffs could pursue an independent 
claim under the ADA, even though they had previously failed on an 
IDEA claim.13 The decision also emphasized that under Title II of 
the ADA, primary consideration should be given to the requests of 
students with disabilities.14 
This Comment will argue that K.M. v. Tustin is a precedential 
decision that expands the rights of deaf or hard-of-hearing students. 
 
 6. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1092.  
 7. Computer Aided Realtime Translation, E-MICH. DEAF AND HARD OF HEARING PEOPLE, 
http://www.michdhh.org/assistive_devices/cart.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). Using trained 
stenographers and computer software, CART can “translate the spoken word into the written 
word nearly as fast as people can talk,” even capturing dialogue and a description of sounds. Id. 
Another benefit of this service is the “legacy of a text file that may be received at the conclusion 
of the class.” Id. 
 8. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1092; see infra notes 36–40 and accompanying text about the IDEA. 
 9. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1098–99. 
 10. See id. at 1100–01. 
 11. See id. at 1100 (“[W]e must address the question by comparing the particular provisions 
of the ADA and the IDEA covering students who are deaf or hard-of-hearing . . . .”). 
 12. Id. at 1102. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1096.  
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Part II will discuss the relevant facts and procedural history of the 
case. Part III will trace the court’s reasoning in reaching its decision, 
particularly the procedural and substantive differences between the 
ADA and IDEA requirements. Part IV will analyze the decision’s 
significance, especially the court’s unique role in identifying key 
misunderstandings of the law and reinterpreting a school district’s 
obligations under the statutes. Most noteworthy is the court’s close 
analysis of statutory text, implementing regulations, and legislative 
intent to establish that primary consideration should be given to the 
student’s needs. Lastly, Part V will conclude with some final 
remarks. 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Though K.M. and D.H. (collectively, “the plaintiffs”) appeared 
to be above-average students, their hearing loss presented significant 
social and communication barriers.15 K.M. had been diagnosed with 
a severe binaural (affecting both ears) hearing loss as an infant.16 As 
a result, she wore two cochlear implants,17 hearing devices for those 
with severe-to-profound hearing loss.18 K.M. also depended on lip 
reading and visual cues.19 Schools included her in general education 
classes since kindergarten, and K.M. performed well academically.20 
Some of her teachers reported that K.M. participated in classroom 
discussions just as capably as other students.21 But K.M. saw her 
situation differently.22 She reported that following along in class 
required intense concentration, and this effort left her mentally 
exhausted at the end of the day.23 She had a particularly difficult time 
hearing when there was background noise, such as the hum of the air 
 
 15. See Reply Brief of Appellant at 5–7, K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 
725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-56259); Brief of Appellant, D.H. ex rel. Harrington v. 
Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-56224). 
 16. Brief of Appellee-Defendant Tustin Unified Sch. Dist. at 3, K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin 
Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-56259). 
 17. Id. at 4. A cochlear implant is a “device that provides direct electrical stimulation to the 
auditory (hearing) nerve in the inner ear.” Cochlear Implants, AM. SPEECH-LANGUAGE-HEARING 
ASS’N, http://www.asha.org/public/hearing/Cochlear-Implant/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2014). 
 18. Id.; Brief of Appellee-Defendant, supra note 16, at 4. 
 19. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 15, at 5. 
 20. Brief of Appellee-Defendant, supra note 16, at 4. 
 21. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1093. 
 22. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 15, at 5–6. 
 23. Id. at 5. 
NOT TURNING A DEAF EAR 11/24/2014  1:00 AM 
1034 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1031 
conditioner or when more than one person was talking.24 She found 
taking notes taxing because she needed to choose between looking 
down at her paper to write or watching the speaker to decipher the 
words.25 Wanting to fit in, K.M. sometimes nodded to pretend that 
she was listening, or laughed along when she did not hear a joke.26 
Likewise, D.H. had moderate-to-profound hearing loss and 
heard only forty to fifty percent of what was said in the classroom.27 
She wore a cochlear implant in one ear and a hearing device in the 
other.28 She needed to listen carefully when people spoke, and she 
paid close attention to their body language.29 She was not always 
aware when she missed something that was said.30 She struggled 
with small group projects and with understanding directions to 
homework assignments, requiring extra time outside of class and 
help from family members.31 However, D.H. learned to adapt to the 
environment of a general classroom by observing her classmates, 
imitating what they did, picking up context clues, and “put[ting] 
together the pieces of the puzzle” based on what she did hear.32 As a 
result of her efforts to blend in, none of her private struggles were 
visible to teachers.33 She earned mostly As in her classes and was 
well liked by peers and teachers.34 
In preparation for high school, both K.M. and D.H. requested 
CART and were denied by their respective school districts.35 The 
plaintiffs then filed an administrative complaint challenging the 
denial under the IDEA.36 The IDEA is a federal statute that funds 
supplemental educational services and support for disabled students 
 
 24. Id. at 10. 
 25. Id. at 6. 
 26. Id. at 5. 
 27. Brief of Appellant, supra note 15, at 11. 
 28. Answering Brief of Appellee-Defendant at 3, D.H. ex rel. Harrington v. Poway Unified 
Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-56224). 
 29. Brief of Appellant, supra note 15, at 13. 
 30. Id. at 15–16. 
 31. Id. at 12, 15, 18. 
 32. Id. at 14. 
 33. Id. at 16–17; see Answering Brief of Appellee-Defendant, supra note 28. 
 34. See Answering Brief of Appellee-Defendant, supra note 28, at 3, 7. 
 35. K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 36. Id. at 1093–94. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act was enacted “to ensure 
that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that 
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and 
prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1400(d)(1)(A) (2004). 
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to ensure that they have access to a free and appropriate public 
education.37 These additional services revolve around a written 
Individualized Education Plan (IEP) that is designed for each student 
to specifically address their needs and tailor services to them.38 Any 
challenge to the IEP must be made through either a due process 
hearing or a state complaint procedure, both of which are 
administrative proceedings.39 The IDEA does not foreclose disabled 
students from pursuing additional constitutional or federal claims, as 
long as they first exhaust their administrative remedies.40 
The administrative law judges (ALJ) in K.M.’s and D.H.’s cases 
concluded that the school districts had complied with their 
obligations under the IDEA to provide students with a “free 
appropriate public education” (FAPE).41 The legal standard for a 
FAPE is fairly low: the student’s IEP must be “reasonably calculated 
to enable the child to receive educational benefits.”42 The IDEA does 
not require that disabled students be provided with a  
“potential-maximizing education.”43 In essence, this means that as 
long as a student receives passing marks and advances from grade to 
grade, a district has met the legal standard for a FAPE.44 
Because both K.M. and D.H. were above-average students who 
had been mainstreamed into general education classes from grade to 
grade, the ALJ concluded that CART was a “potential-maximizing” 
 
 37. Section 504 and IDEA Comparison Chart, NAT’L CENTER FOR LEARNING DISABILITIES, 
http://www.ncld.org/disability-advocacy/learn-ld-laws/adaaa-section-504/section-504-idea-
comparison-chart (last visited Apr. 12, 2014). See infra note 42 and accompanying text about the 
FAPE requirement. 
 38. A Guide to the Individualized Education Program, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/parents/needs/speced/iepguide/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2014). The 
IEP team consists of parents, teachers, administrators, and other educational services providers 
that regularly monitor and evaluate the student’s progress. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1097; see also Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 934 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
 41. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1093–94. 
 42. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 
U.S. 176, 207 (1982). Rowley is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision that set the standard for 
a FAPE. It reversed a Second Circuit decision directing a New York school board to provide 
sign-language interpretation in the classroom for an eight-year-old deaf child. Id. at 209–10. The 
Supreme Court defined a FAPE by holding that it does not require a state to maximize a disabled 
student’s educational potential to match that of non-disabled students. Id. at 177. Because the 
child was performing above average and advancing from grade to grade, the Court found that the 
district had met its obligation to provide a FAPE under the IDEA. Id. at 209. 
 43. Id. at 197 n.21. 
 44. Id. at 204. 
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service not required under the IDEA.45 The plaintiffs already 
received supplemental services and supports such as preferential 
seating, auditory-verbal therapy, FM amplification, repeating and 
paraphrasing of class discussions, copies of class notes, and extra 
time for assignments that the ALJ found satisfied the standard for a 
FAPE.46 
Dissatisfied, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in district court 
challenging the administrative decision and claiming disability 
discrimination under Title II of the ADA.47 Title II is a federal 
statute, enacted in 1990, that prohibits public entities from 
discriminating on the basis of disability.48 The district courts granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, affirming the 
administrative decision on the IDEA claim.49 Regarding the ADA 
claim, the district courts held that “a plaintiff’s failure to show a 
deprivation of a FAPE under the IDEA dooms a claim . . . under the 
ADA.”50 The plaintiffs then challenged the district courts’ rulings on 
their ADA claims.51 
III.  REASONING OF THE COURT 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals began by comparing the 
IDEA’s and the ADA’s procedural and substantive requirements.52 
First, it noted that the IDEA provides primarily procedural 
protections for disabled students, rather than substantive ones: 
“States receiving federal funds under the IDEA must show that they 
have implemented ‘policies and procedures’ to provide disabled 
students with a FAPE.”53 For students who are deaf or hard of 
hearing, an IEP team must consider “the child’s language and 
communication needs,” “the concerns of the parents for enhancing 
the education of their child,” and “whether the child needs assistive 
 
 45. See Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1093–94. 
 46. Answering Brief of Appellee-Defendant, supra note 28, at 22; Brief of Appellee-
Defendant, supra note 16, at 6. 
 47. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1093–94. 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1990) (“[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of 
such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”). 
 49. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1093–95. 
 50. Id. at 1098. 
 51. Id. at 1094–95. 
 52. See id. at 1095–97. 
 53. Id. at 1095. 
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technology devices and services.”54 The IDEA provides parents with 
procedural safeguards, such as “the right to participate in IEP 
meetings and the right to challenge an IEP in state administrative 
proceedings and, ultimately, in state or federal court.”55 As 
previously mentioned, the IDEA’s substantive standard is fairly low: 
the IEP must be “reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive 
educational benefits.”56 It does not require states to provide disabled 
students with a “potential-maximizing education.”57 Instead, it only 
requires a threshold minimum for students who are mainstreamed 
into regular classrooms: passing grades and advancement from grade 
to grade.58 
In contrast to the IDEA, the ADA establishes more stringent 
substantive requirements for public entities.59 Title II of the ADA, 
which applies to public services, assigns the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) with the task of establishing regulations to implement its 
provisions.60 The key regulation at the heart of the plaintiffs’ 
argument is the “effective communications regulation” in 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.160, which has two requirements.61 First, public entities must 
“take appropriate steps to ensure that communications with 
applicants, participants, and members of the public with disabilities 
are as effective as communications with others.”62 Second, public 
entities must “furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and services where 
necessary to afford an individual with a disability an equal 
opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, 
program, or activity conducted by a public entity.”63 In determining 
which services are necessary, “a public entity shall give primary 
consideration to the requests of the individual with disabilities.”64 
According to the appellate court, the essential difference 
between the IDEA and the ADA is that the IDEA emphasizes access, 
 
 54. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(iv)–(v) (2012).  
 55. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1095. 
 56. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester Cnty. v. Rowley, 458 
U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982). 
 57. Id. at 197 n.21. 
 58. Id. at 204. 
 59. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1100. 
 60. Id. at 1096. 
 61. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (1991). 
 62. Id. § 35.160(a) (emphasis added). 
 63. Id. § 35.160(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. § 35.160(b)(2). 
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while the ADA emphasizes equal access: 
[T]he IDEA sets only a floor of access to education for 
children with communications disabilities, but requires 
school districts to provide the individualized services 
necessary to get a child to that floor, regardless of the costs, 
administrative burdens, or program alterations required. 
Title II and its implementing regulations . . . require public 
entities to take steps toward making existing services not 
just accessible, but equally accessible to people with 
communication disabilities, but only insofar as doing so 
does not pose an undue burden or require a fundamental 
alteration of their programs.65 
While the IDEA is concerned with meeting a threshold level of 
education by an IEP, Title II of the ADA is concerned with meeting 
the communication and educational needs of disabled students as 
effectively as those of other students.66 However, the court noted that 
there are limitations to the application of these Title II requirements: 
a public entity need not “take any action that it can demonstrate 
would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a service, 
program, or activity or in undue financial and administrative 
burdens.”67 Thus, Title II provides public entities a defense that is 
unavailable under the IDEA.68 
The appellate court weighed other factors in its decision to allow 
the plaintiffs to pursue their ADA claims. The court emphasized that 
the ADA regulations require that “primary consideration” be given 
“to the requests of the individual with disabilities”69—a provision 
that “has no direct counterpart in the IDEA.”70 While the IDEA 
requires that schools involve parents and students in the  
decision-making process, it does not give their requests “primary” 
weight.71 Furthermore, the court gave great deference to the DOJ’s 
interpretation of the Title II effective communication regulations, as 
 
 65. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1097. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 1096 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.164). 
 68. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1101. 
 69. 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2). 
 70. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1101. 
 71. Id. (citing Bradley ex rel. Bradley v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., 443 F.3d 965, 975 (8th Cir. 
2006)). 
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expressed in the DOJ’s amicus brief:72 “An agency’s interpretation 
of its own regulation is ‘controlling unless plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.’”73 Based on the court’s statutory 
analysis and the DOJ’s own interpretation of the effective 
communication regulation, the court concluded that “the IDEA 
FAPE requirement and the Title II communication requirements are 
significantly different.”74 As a result, the court reversed the district 
courts’ grant of summary judgment for the defendants and remanded 
the case to give the plaintiffs an opportunity to argue the merits of 
their claims.75 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
K.M. v. Tustin is influential for two important reasons. First, the 
case explicitly recognized that the IDEA and the ADA impose 
different and sometimes non-overlapping requirements. Second, the 
case established that an inquiry into a school district’s compliance 
with Title II requirements should give primary consideration to the 
student’s needs. 
A.  K.M. v. Tustin Is the First Case to Explicitly  
Recognize a Difference Between the IDEA  
and the ADA in Meeting the Needs  
of Deaf or Hard-of-Hearing Students 
K.M. v. Tustin addressed a matter of first impression in the Ninth 
Circuit. It is the first case to consider the differences between a 
school district’s obligations under the IDEA’s FAPE requirement 
and the Title II “effective communications” requirement in meeting 
the needs of deaf or hard-of-hearing students.76 In doing so, K.M. v. 
 
 72. Id. at 1100. The DOJ argued in its amicus curiae brief to the court that K.M. presented a 
legitimate question of fact regarding the district’s failure to meet her effective communication 
needs under Title II, thus precluding summary judgment. The court’s interpretation of the 
effective communication regulation closely resembles the DOJ’s interpretation. See Brief of the 
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant and Urging Remand, K.M. ex rel. Bright v. 
Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-56259) [hereinafter DOJ 
Amicus Curiae Brief], available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/app/briefs/kmtustinbr.pdf. 
 73. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1100 (citing M.R. v. Dreyfus, 697 F.3d 706, 735 (9th Cir. 2012)). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1103. 
 76. Id. at 1100 (“Because we have no cases addressing the parallelism between the IDEA 
and either the Title II effective communications regulation or its analogous Section 504 
regulation, we must construe the relevant statutes and regulations as a question of first 
impression.”). 
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Tustin identified several misunderstandings of the law by the lower 
district courts.77 First, district courts have overstated the connection 
between the IDEA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973.78 Section 504 is a “civil rights law to prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of disability in programs and activities, public and 
private, that receive federal financial assistance.”79 Second, district 
courts have overstated the connection between Section 504 and Title 
II of the ADA, which has led to the misunderstanding that a failed 
claim under the IDEA necessarily dooms all claims under Title II of 
the ADA.80 
Other circuits have perpetuated this misunderstanding that the 
IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA are essentially equivalent.81 In 
Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. School District of Philadelphia Board 
of Education,82 the Third Circuit held that the “same standards” 
governed the plaintiffs’ Section 504 and ADA claims on behalf of 
their cognitively disabled child, so the claims could be addressed “in 
the same breath.”83 The court did, however, vacate the lower court’s 
grant of summary judgment for the defendants on the Section 504 
and ADA claims, recognizing that a failed IDEA claim did not 
necessarily foreclose a claim under Section 504 and the ADA.84 But 
this distinction was never explicit in the court’s reasoning, nor did 
the court elaborate on the differences between the statutes.85 In fact, 
the court preferred to “refrain from wading into this dispute.”86 
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged a difference between the 
 
 77. Id. at 1098–1100. 
 78. Id. at 1098–99. 
 79. A Comparison of ADA, IDEA, and Section 504, DISABILITY RIGHTS EDUC. & DEF. 
FUND, http://dredf.org/advocacy/comparison.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). Along with the 
IDEA and the ADA, Section 504 provides disabled students a third cause of action when 
asserting a district’s failure to meet their educational needs. See id. Section 504, like the IDEA, 
also contains a FAPE requirement, but the Ninth Circuit held that the two are “overlapping but 
different.” See Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 924 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 80. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1098–1100. 
 81. See infra notes 83, 88, 95. 
 82. 587 F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 83. Id. at 189 (citing McDonald v. Pa., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, Polk Ctr., 62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (holding that “[w]hether suit is filed under the Rehabilitation Act or under the 
Disabilities Act, the substantive standards for determining liability are the same”)). 
 84. Id. at 189–90. 
 85. Id. (“We think that the record contains enough of a genuine factual dispute about 
whether the School District in fact provided Ferren with a FAPE, not to mention whether the 
School District otherwise committed [Section 504] and ADA violations.”). 
 86. Id. at 190. 
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statutes in Ellenberg v. New Mexico Military Institute,87 but its 
application is limited.88 In Ellenberg, the plaintiffs sued a public 
military boarding school for denying admission to their emotionally 
disabled child in violation of the IDEA.89 The appellate court 
dismissed the IDEA claim because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust 
the IDEA’s procedural requirements.90 However, the court held that: 
[O]ur precedent does not hold that a party’s discrimination 
claims under [Section 504] and the ADA must 
automatically be dismissed if an IDEA claim fails. . . . 
Thus, even if plaintiffs conceded that New Mexico fully 
satisfied its IDEA obligations . . . they could pursue claims 
under the ADA and [Section 504] on the grounds that [the 
plaintiff] was precluded from receiving a state benefit—
military-style education—provided to her non-disabled 
peers.91 
Ellenberg recognized that compliance with the IDEA’s FAPE 
requirement did not establish compliance with Section 504 or the 
ADA.92 Any other interpretation of the statutes would allow a school 
to discriminate against a disabled student as long as it provided the 
student with a FAPE.93 However, it is not clear whether Ellenberg 
extends to claims by deaf or hard-of-hearing students who are not 
requesting a state benefit provided to non-disabled peers but, instead, 
an auxiliary transcription service. 
In Moseley v. Board of Education of Albuquerque Public 
Schools,94 the Tenth Circuit avoided defining how far Ellenberg 
extends.95 The plaintiff in Moseley, like K.M. and D.H., was a deaf 
student who requested and was denied CART.96 The district court 
ruled against him, finding that “denial of the IDEA claim precluded 
the [Section] 504 and Title II claims as all three claims shared the 
same substantive standard and the same set of facts gave rise to 
 
 87. 478 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 1271–73. 
 90. Id. at 1276. 
 91. Id. at 1281–82. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1281–82. 
 94. 483 F.3d 689 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 95. Id. at 692 n.5. 
 96. Id. at 690–92. 
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each.”97 The plaintiff appealed the decision, arguing that the lower 
court had improperly dismissed his Section 504 and ADA claims by 
conflating their substantive standards with that of the IDEA.98 
In Moseley, the Tenth Circuit avoided ruling on the plaintiff’s 
appeal because it found that his claims were moot.99 By the time of 
the appeal, the plaintiff had graduated from high school, thereby 
mooting his claim to a FAPE under the IDEA.100 In a sweeping 
statement, the court also held that “[l]ikewise, Mr. Moseley’s general 
request for other appropriate relief is moot.”101 The court’s reasoning 
reflects the persistent presumption that a plaintiff’s Section 504 and 
ADA claims have no independent basis if his IDEA claim fails.102 
Against this statutory background, it is easy to see why K.M. v. 
Tustin is a precedent-setting case. The Ninth Circuit is one of the 
first to delve into and analyze the actual text of the statutes, their 
implementing regulations, and the intent of the legislators.103 In 
particular, the court provided valuable insight into the connection 
between Title II of the ADA and Section 504, a relationship more 
nuanced than even the Ninth Circuit previously acknowledged.104 
In K.M. v. Tustin, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that Congress 
mandated that the federal regulations implementing Title II of the 
ADA be consistent with “certain, but not all of the regulations 
enforcing Section 504.”105 Specifically, Congress mandated that the 
regulations concerning “communications” for Title II be consistent 
with Section 504 regulations codified at 28 C.F.R. § 39, which is not 
 
 97. Id. at 692 (relying on Urban by Urban v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 
728 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that “[r]elying on the similarity between the substantive and 
procedural frameworks of the IDEA and Section 504 . . . we conclude that if a disabled child is 
not entitled to a neighborhood placement under the IDEA, he is not entitled to such a placement 
under section 504”)). 
 98. Id. at 692. 
 99. Id. at 689. 
 100. Id. at 693 (relying on T.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 54, Stroud, Oklahoma, 265 F.3d 1090, 
1092 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that “[o]nce a student has graduated, he is no longer entitled to a 
FAPE; thus any claim that a FAPE was deficient becomes moot upon a valid graduation”)). 
 101. Id.  
 102. See K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1098–1100 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
 103. See id. at 1095–1101. 
 104. See id. at 1095–98 (“We have observed on occasion that ‘there is no significant 
difference in the analysis of rights and obligations created by the two Acts.’” (quoting Vinson v. 
Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1152 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002))). 
 105. Id. at 1099. 
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the Section 504 FAPE regulation.106 
This departure is significant. It proves that Congress did not 
intend Title II of the ADA to impose a FAPE requirement, so a Title 
II claim is not predicated on a district’s provision of a FAPE under 
either the IDEA or Section 504.107 The “effective communications” 
provision of Title II of the ADA “establishes independent obligations 
on the part of the public schools to students who are deaf or hard-of-
hearing.”108 While the IDEA is concerned with meeting the threshold 
educational needs of disabled students, Title II of the ADA is 
concerned with meeting the educational needs of disabled students as 
effectively as the needs of non-disabled students.109 Thus, a plaintiff 
has standing to sue under Title II regardless of the outcome of his or 
her IDEA claim.110 
B.  K.M. v. Tustin Recognizes That Disabled  
Individuals Are in the Best Position 
 to Speak About Their Disability. 
K.M v. Tustin is a triumph for the deaf or hard-of-hearing 
community in less obvious but radical ways. The case raised the 
controversial question of who is in the best position to assess 
whether a disabled student’s needs are being met, and to what extent 
those needs should be met.111 The court’s decision indicates that the 
challenges and intricacies of being deaf or hard of hearing are best 
understood by those who actually suffer the disability.112 
As K.M.’s and D.H.’s stories illustrate, a student’s daily 
experiences with a disability do not always match a teacher’s limited 
perception and understanding of it.113 The district court that ruled 
against K.M. acknowledged in its decision that it was “reluctant to 
adopt fully teacher and administrator conclusions about K.M.’s 
 
 106. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b) (1990) (“With respect to ‘program accessibility, 
existing facilities,’ and ‘communications,’ such regulations shall be consistent with regulations 
and analysis as in part 39 of title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations . . . .”). 
 107. Tustin, 725 F.3d at 1099. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See id. at 1097. 
 110. Id. at 1101 (“[W]e must reject the argument that the success or failure of a student’s 
IDEA claim dictates, as a matter of law, the success or failure of her Title II claim.”). 
 111. See id. at 1100–01. 
 112. See id. (emphasizing that the ADA gives primary consideration to the requests of the 
individual with disabilities). 
 113. Compare Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 15, at 5–8, with Brief of Appellee-
Defendant, supra note 16, at 7–12. 
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comprehension levels over the testimony of K.M. herself.”114 The 
court further recognized that K.M.’s “difficulty following 
discussions may have been greater than her teachers perceived.”115 
K.M. argued that the school district focused solely on teachers’ 
favorable observations of her, which was only a result of “her own 
considerable effort” to fit in and appear normal.116 The school district 
mistook K.M.’s above-average performance in school for effective 
communication, unaware of the mental exhaustion, frustration, and 
confusion that K.M. experienced on a daily basis.117 
The school district also ignored teachers’ less favorable 
observations of K.M. that hinted at signs of trouble.118 One teacher 
had noted that K.M. lost focus during lectures and needed to take 
better notes.119 The same teacher could not recommend K.M. for an 
advanced placement history class because she was not active enough 
in class discussions.120 Arguably, the observations of a teacher—who 
juggles multiple tasks and manages a classroom full of students—is 
“not an accurate determination” of individual hearing loss.121 But the 
ALJ and the district court relied heavily on these observations in 
deciding that K.M.’s needs had been met—and relied on them 
selectively, disregarding all evidence to the contrary.122 
K.M. v. Tustin is a triumph for the deaf or hard-of-hearing 
community because it recognizes that disabled students are in the 
best position to speak about their disability. As the DOJ noted in the 
Americans with Disabilities Act Title II Technical Assistance Manual 
and amicus curiae brief to the Ninth Circuit, “the individual with a 
disability is most familiar with his or her disability,”123 and can best 
“identify his or her needs and the type of aid that will most 
 
 114. K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., No. SACV 10-1011 DOC (MLGx), 
2011 WL 2633673, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011), rev’d in part, 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 15, at 6–8. 
 117. Id. at 7. 
 118. See id. at 9–11. 
 119. Id. at 9–10. 
 120. Id. at 10. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., No. SACV 10-1011 DOC (MLGx), 
2011 WL 2633673, at *9 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2011), rev’d in part, 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 123. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § II-7.1100 [hereinafter TITLE II TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE MANUAL], available at http://www.ada.gov/taman2.html#II-7.1100. 
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effectively provide communications for him or her.”124 It is 
especially important to give “primary consideration” to the disabled 
individual’s preferences because of the “particularly personal nature 
of choosing a mode of communication.”125 The difference between 
one assistive technology device and another might seem 
inconsequential to an individual who does not rely on such devices. 
But for deaf or hard-of-hearing persons, this choice may determine 
how they interact with and process the world around them.126 
The decision of which assistive technology device to use is 
highly personal and tailored to the individual’s needs.127 It considers 
a variety of relevant factors, such as the student’s abilities and 
difficulties accessing information, environmental considerations such 
as noise and room acoustics, the student’s own familiarity and 
comfort level with certain technology, and the peculiarities of the 
class itself (whether it involves lecture or discussion, the amount of 
group work, the types of assignments, even the teacher’s own 
movements and walking patterns).128 In assessing these highly 
variable factors and their daily impact on a student’s learning 
experience, the inquiry must revolve around the student.129 
By giving “primary consideration” to the needs of deaf or  
hard-of-hearing students, K.M. v. Tustin has potentially far-reaching 
and radical social implications. Deaf or hard-of-hearing students face 
communication obstacles that can significantly impact their social 
interactions with peers.130 When mainstreamed into regular 
classrooms, they are likely surrounded by only hearing individuals, 
 
 124. DOJ Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 72, at 19 (citing TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
MANUAL § II-7.1100). 
 125. Id. at 23 (citing TITLE II TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL § II-7.1100). 
 126. See Stacie Heckendorf, Assistive Technology for Students who are Deaf or Hard of 
Hearing, WIS. ASSISTIVE TECH. INITIATIVE (WATI) 1, 6 (2009), http://www.wati.org/content 
/supports/free/pdf/Ch13-Hearing.pdf (“Assistive technology for deaf or hard of hearing students 
often has a profound impact on their ability to access information and be part of a 
community . . . .”). 
 127. See id. at 4 (“Each deaf or hard of hearing student performs differently in regards to how 
they utilize their residual hearing, are affected by different environments, and benefit from 
technology.”). 
 128. Id. at 4–5. 
 129. Id. at 4–6 (“[A]ccessibility needs are highly variable and may require different 
technologies over time, within different environments and even among students.”). 
 130. See Yael Bat-Chava & Elizabeth Deignan, Peer Relationships of Children with Cochlear 
Implants, 6(3) J. DEAF STUD. DEAF EDUC. 186 (2001), http://jdsde.oxfordjournals.org 
/content/6/3/186.full.pdf+html. 
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which makes social integration difficult.131 In particular, “[o]ral 
communication poses the greatest difficulty in establishing and 
maintaining social relationships.”132 As a result, students often 
“report feelings of loneliness and a lack of close friendships.”133 A 
2001 study of children with cochlear implants found that, despite the 
social benefits of using the implants, communication difficulties and 
feelings of isolation were lasting and persistent.134 Residual lags in 
speech and hearing and a lack of patience and acceptance by hearing 
peers were barriers to oral communication.135 The seemingly casual 
verbal exchanges between individuals that are often taken for 
granted—a phone call, chitchat, or the shared understanding of 
verbal cues—are the building blocks of successful social 
relationships.136 
Providing plaintiffs with the CART service can play a crucial 
role in including deaf or hard-of-hearing students in the classroom 
and the world beyond the classroom.137 On a micro level, the CART 
service can enhance students’ understanding of and participation in 
class discussions, augmenting their academic enjoyment and 
potential.138 On a macro level, the CART service has the potential to 
improve students’ social relationships with peers, increasing their 
self-esteem and sense of belonging in society at large.139 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In its K.M. v. Tustin decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed a grant 
of summary judgment for the defendants and remanded the decision 
to the district courts, holding that a genuine issue of material fact 
existed.140 In light of the court’s clarification of the differences 
between the IDEA and the ADA, the district courts must now decide 
whether the school districts met the educational and communication 
needs of the plaintiffs as effectively as the needs of non-disabled 
 
 131. Id. at 187 (citations omitted). 
 132. Id. (citation omitted). 
 133. Id. (citation omitted). 
 134. Id. at 195. 
 135. Id. at 191–92. 
 136. See id. at 190–92. 
 137. See Heckendorf, supra note 126, at 6. 
 138. See id. at 15. 
 139. See Bat-Chava & Deignan, supra note 130. 
 140. K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1103 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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students under Title II of the ADA.141 
Nevertheless, K.M. v. Tustin is a step in the right direction for 
the deaf or hard-of-hearing community. For the first time, the Ninth 
Circuit explicitly recognized that a school district has different and 
sometimes non-overlapping obligations to disabled individuals under 
the Title II effective communications requirement than under the 
IDEA’s FAPE requirement.142 The court clarified that the standard 
under the ADA is not one of access, but of equal access, and that a 
failed IDEA claim does not necessarily foreclose an ADA claim.143 
Lastly, the court reaffirmed that the requests of disabled individuals 
must be given primary consideration in determining what constitutes 
appropriate services.144 In doing so, the court established that 
disabled individuals are in the best position to speak about their 
needs and disabilities.145 
Giving deaf or hard-of-hearing students primary consideration in 
the assessment of appropriate assistive services allows them to 
participate in a dialogue that extends far beyond the classroom. It is a 
dialogue that asks who is in the best position to determine disabled 
students’ needs, and demands that deaf or hard-of-hearing students 
be allowed to speak for themselves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 141. Id. at 1102–03. At the time of this Comment’s publication, defendants Tustin and Poway 
Unified School Districts had unsuccessfully sought a rehearing before the Ninth Circuit. The U.S. 
Supreme Court also denied their petition for a writ of certiorari. The district court granted D.H’s 
motion for preliminary injunction and ordered that Poway Unified School District provide her 
with the CART service. See D.H. ex rel. Harrington v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., No. 09-CV-
2621-L NLS, 2013 WL 6730163 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2013).  
 142. See id. at 1102. 
 143. Id. at 1097, 1099, 1101. 
 144. Id. at 1096. 
 145. See id. at 1100–01.  
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